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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most legal analyses of residential solar power conflicts either support or 
assume the need for the statutory protection of solar investments. This 
perspective arises from the theory of property rights efficiency — i.e., 
residents will only make expensive investments in solar panels if they have a 
legally recognized protection to install a solar system receiving most of the 
solar radiation passing over a neighbor’s land. Yet, underlying these disputes 
is a tradeoff between two productive uses: (1) Vertical land development and 
(2) the generation of electricity from solar panels.  
Recent decades have seen the rise of state-level solar rights statutes,1 
implying that the development-solar legal balancing act has tipped in favor of 
solar owners. However, looking at individual disputes, both vertical 
development and solar often could make compelling normative claims to the 
efficiency of property protections via a servitude upon the other. The Coase 
Theorem2 clarifies that to whom rights are initially assigned is likely 
immaterial with respect to efficient outcomes in neighbor-versus-neighbor 
conflicts; with low transaction costs, the highest-valued user will end up with 
the property right after bargaining. Without property rights, however, this 
market cannot function.3 So, there is a legal-theoretical basis, grounded in 
promoting efficient use, for the statutory assignment of solar rights. This 
article builds upon an argument that the preceding efficiency-based rationale 
is too simplified to inform a legal analysis of solar statutes. 
Although statutes are a simple and direct way to assign solar property 
rights, it does not necessarily follow that statutes are simple and direct to 
enforce. This article argues that the enforcement of solar statutes through 
courts is far more costly than many solar-statute advocates may recognize. 
Recent amendments to solar statutes in California, as this article will explain, 
are revealing that California’s heretofore-nation-leading government is 
                                                
1 Evan J. Rosenthal, Letting the Sunshine In: Protecting Residential Access to Solar 
Energy in Common Interest Developments, 40 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 995, 1004 (2013). 
2 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
3 Schmid, A. Allan, Government, Property, Markets . . . In That Order . . . Not 
Government Versus Markets, in THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY, 237-41 (Nicholas Mercuro and Warren Samuel eds., JAI 
Press 1999). 
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largely abdicating its enforcement role. As will be discussed, California is 
shifting the burden of enforcement to private disputants at the local level. 
 
Enforcement issues have important implications for the implied 
efficiency of assigning solar property rights, but recent trends also pose an 
opportunity for normative institutional design that could potentially promote 
more effective dispute processing. The Coase Theorem4 makes clear that 
when enforcement costs are high or prohibitive, then the property rights 
efficiency argument cannot fully be realized as promised.5 This article will 
show that the most effective solution to the solar-rights enforcement problem 
is that governments should redirect energy to promoting local negotiation 
mechanisms.  
 
This thesis builds on the lessons from recent legal cases and scholarship 
on solar conflicts within common interest developments (“CID”). A key 
conflict in this arena, which settled in 2008, garnered national media 
attention and spurred state-level legislative action.6 More recently, a set of 
conflicts made the news in Coachella Valley, as fees imposed by 
homeowners associations on solar projects created local-level disputes.7 
Unfortunately for the researcher, these conflicts are by nature difficult to 
detect empirically and to assess quantitatively. One anticipates that most of 
these conflicts have occurred without record because it is likely they are 
being resolved through private negotiation and/or via a community dispute 
resolution process.  
 
The legal outcomes of these cases are driven by an institutional conflict 
between community-level covenants, conditions, and restrictions 
                                                
4 Coase, supra note 2. 
5 Joshua M. Duke, Property Rights and the Environment, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY, 
NATURAL RESOURCES, AND ENVIRONMENT, 75-79 (Jason Shogren, ed. 2013). 
6 Felicity Barringer, Trees Block Solar Panels, and a Feud Ends in Court, New York 
Times (April 7, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/science/earth/07redwood.html?pagewanted=all&_r
=0. 
7 Sammy Roth, Some Homeowners Associations Make It Difficult to Go Solar, THE 
DESERT SUN (May 18, 2015), 
http://www.desertsun.com/story/tech/science/energy/2015/05/18/homeowners-
associations-solar/27416213/. 
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(“CC&Rs”), and rights assigned by solar statutes. To preview the result, 
courts are turning to a “reasonableness”8 standard to determine when CC&Rs 
go too far; this implies that solar rights are limited, leaving it to judges and 
juries to determine the appropriate outcome in the development-solar 
balancing act. This article will argue that private litigation in courts is, 
relatively, poorly positioned to make this balance effectively. Instead, a 
market or mediated solution is likely better, albeit imperfect. 
 
This paper uses a comparative institutional analysis9 of an actual solar 
conflict in California.  The case is Tesoro del Valle Master Homebuilders 
Association v. Griffin,10 and involves the placement of a residential solar 
system in a residential development.  The analysis supports the normative 
argument that the best of the imperfect conflict resolution processes may be 
for the states to: assign rights via statutes, but also support a more flexible 
enforcement approach based on local dispute-resolution norms and formal 
mechanisms. The local processes may be based on markets (Coasean11 
bargaining) or on informal norms (Ellickson12). Further, if these local, private 
negotiations are promoted and facilitated by governments, it ultimately may 
help lower the costs of reaching agreement between neighbors, ensuring 
efficient outcomes and allowing for more substantive participation by the 
disputing private parties than litigation-based enforcement. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The legal protection of solar rights dates to the Roman era, in which civil 
laws required a builder to have “servitude over neighboring land if he were 
not to leave his neighbors a minimum or reasonable amount of daylight.”13 
As early as 1865, Robert Kerr, the nineteenth-century London architect who 
                                                
8 Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Association v. Martin Griffin, 200 Cal. App. 4th 
619 (2011). 
9 NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
10 Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Assn. v. Griffin, 200 Cal. App. 4th 619, 630 
(2011). 
11 Coase, supra note 2. 
12 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (Harv. U. Press eds., 1st ed. 1991). 
13 See Stephen Christopher Unger, Note, Ancient Lights in Wrigleyville: An Argument for 
the Unobstructed View of a National Pastime, 38 IND. L.J. 533, 542–43 (2005). See also 
Borimir Jordan & John Perlin, Solar Energy Use and Litigation in Ancient Times, 1 
SOLAR L. REP. 583, 592–93 (1979). 
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authored On Ancient Lights and the Evidence of Surveyors Thereon, 
summarized the common law of “ancient lights”.14 His analysis points to the 
conflict between property rights and highest-and-best-use land development 
in London during this time.15 Statutory protection of right to “ancient lights” 
originates from the general statutes in the Prescription Act of 1832, which 
codified absolute rights to light after twenty years of access.16  
Most early American courts, however, “unanimously repudiated the 
doctrine of ancient lights, with opinions reflecting the feeling that the 
protection of access to sunlight was not suited to a new and growing country 
because it would hinder the development of land.”17 Generally, U.S. courts 
favored intensive development over a protection from obstruction of light,18 
but a few states previously “guaranteed landowners access to sunlight 
through recognition of prescriptive easements under this English doctrine.”19 
A leading example of favored development occurred in 1959 when the 
Florida District Court of Appeals ruled in Fontainebleau Hotel Corporation 
v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc. that there is no legal right to air and sunlight: 
 
                                                
14 ROBERT KERR, ON ANCIENT LIGHTS AND THE EVIDENCE OF SURVEYORS THEREON 
(Nabu Press eds., 1st 3d. 2010) (1865). 
15 Id. at 1. (“As the value of house property has increased, disputes of this class have 
become more common than ever, more difficult of settlement, and more expensive. 
Serious complaints are made in all quarters--on the one hand, that vexatious litigants are 
permitted by frivolous technicalities to hamper improvement where improvement ought 
most to be encouraged; on the other, that bold speculators are able to override the rights 
of less wealthy and more timid neighbours, the very class who most require protection. 
Demands are made for legislative interference; and even Chancery judges confess 
themselves bewildered in the subtleties of pleading, and the conflict of interests equally 
entitled, not merely to legal respect, but to personal sympathy.”).   
16 Prescription Act, 2 & 3 Will. 4 ch. 71 (1832). 
17 Franklin Gevurtz, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 CAL. L. REV. 94, 
105 (1977) (According to Gevurtz, “the doctrine of ancient lights is essentially the 
recognition of a prescriptive easement to light and air.”). 
18 Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 127 (1971), 99 Cal. 
Rptr. 350, 357-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). 
19 Tawny L. Alvarez, Don't Take My Sunshine Away: Right-to-Light and Solar Energy in 
the Twenty-First Century, 28 PACE L. REV. 535, 538 (2008). 
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“No American decision has been cited, and independent 
research has revealed none, in which it has been held that — in the 
absence of some contractual or statutory obligation — a landowner 
has a legal right to the free flow of light and air across the adjoining 
land of his neighbor. Even at common law, the landowner had no 
legal right, in the absence of an easement or uninterrupted use and 
enjoyment for a period of 20 years, to unobstructed light and air 
from the adjoining land. Blumberg v. Weiss, 1941, 129 N.J. Eq. 34, 
17 A.2d 823; 1 Am.Jur., Adjoining Landowners, § 51. And the 
English doctrine of "ancient lights" has been unanimously 
repudiated in this country. 1 Am.Jur., Adjoining Landowners, § 49, 
p. 533; Lynch v. Hill, 1939, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614, overruling 
Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643. There being, then, no legal 
right to the free flow of light and air from the adjoining land, it is 
universally held that where a structure serves a useful and 
beneficial purpose, it does not give rise to a cause of action, either 
for damages or for an injunction under the maxim sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas, even though it causes injury to another by 
cutting off the light and air and interfering with the view that would 
otherwise be available over adjoining land in its natural state, 
regardless of the fact that the structure may have been erected 
partly for spite.” 20 
 
The Fontainbleau court also noted that when a structure serves an 
efficient purpose, it cannot give rise to nuisance action for injunction or 
damages, even in the event of “irreparable injury.”21 The historical U.S. 
common law rule therefore largely supports vertical land development but 
inadvertently creates disincentives for landowners to adopt solar 
photovoltaics (PV) power systems.22  
                                                
20 Fontainebleau Hotel Corporation v Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1959). 
21 Id.  at 358-59. 
22 This article does not focus on a purely common law approach to determining solar 
rights, using principles of nuisance as a defense against vertical development, but instead 
it explores the implications of the new wave of statutes that have already assigned clear 
solar rights. The focus is on the roles of transaction, and especially enforcement, costs 
and the relative ability of dispute resolution procedures to resolve U.S. solar rights 
conflicts efficiently and cost effectively. Common law solutions were sufficient until 
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Solar disputes are by nature spatially localized problems. These disputes 
might be better resolved through local or bilateral solutions than by one-size-
fits-all standards. It is possible that state-level uniform standards awarding 
rights to solar parties could prevent some socially efficient vertical 
development, if neighbors are unable to reach an agreement. Solar statutes 
also implicitly grant veto or holdout power to solar owners in preventing 
vertical development. State-level legislative action further can be ineffective 
if high monitoring and enforcement costs prevent authorities from readily 
protecting the PV owner’s solar right, and these authorities are unlikely to do 
so when they are far removed from the conflict. Further, it is the disputants 
themselves that have the best information about the conflict, their values, and 
neighborhood welfare. Finally, statutory enforcement ignores the power of a 
community to resolve its own disputes. These points align Coasean resolution 
with Robert Ellickson’s view that people often find that the cost of 
submitting to formal dispute resolution is too high, such that they would 
rather resolve these issues on a local, informal basis.23 
                                                                                                                     
technological advances triggered an incompatibility between high-rise buildings (and 
other sun-blockers such as trees) and the rise of rooftop-mounted and other solar 
photovoltaics (“PVs”). The boom in residential solar PV installations raises the stakes in 
the right to light debate because these systems represent valuable property — a revenue 
stream in the form of on-site electricity generation, resulting grid energy savings, and 
potential net-energy metering benefits (depending on state statutes in the particular 
location). A purely common law dispute processing, having evolved in the United States, 
is clearly a highly inadequate solution and has been progressively replaced by statutory 
protection for sunlight in the form of solar access laws that protect solar PV installations. 
In contrast to instances where statutes simply codify common law rules, solar has 
witnessed the opposite pattern. In short, the trend has been to use statutes to create 
relatively uniform standards that work against the common law rule. This uniformity 
could potentially prevent conflict by aligning expectations for all disputants. 
23 See Coase, supra note 2; ELLICKSON, supra note 12; Bryan Caplan, Robert Ellickson’s 
Order without Law: A Review, GEORGE MASON UNIV. (October 1992), 
http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/ellick.htm (stating that “[n]ot only is legislation 
unnecessary for law, but law is unnecessary for order. After studying dispute resolution 
among ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California, Ellickson came to realize that 
most people find the costs of learning about the law (judge-made or statutory) and 
submitting to formal resolution procedures to be so high that it is easier to fall back on 
common-sense norms. He finds that all three of the functions of law - dispute resolution, 
rule formation, and enforcement - get supplied by means of these informal norms.”). 
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The foregoing argument raises the possibility that statutory rights 
assignment and centralized government enforcement may be less effective 
than statutory rights with a more localized dispute resolution process. The 
tension arises in balancing the enforcement costs of the former approach with 
the transaction and negotiation costs of the latter. If these costs are highly 
asymmetric, then this creates a comparative institutional analysis problem24 
with differential impacts in terms of efficiency and access to participation. 
Therefore, a single institutional analysis of statutory enforcement will not be 
sufficient to result in a meaningful conclusion — i.e., statutory enforcement 
is costly and thus local negotiations are automatically superior. Instead, this 
article presents a comparative institutional analysis between the public 
solution of statutory enforcement and the private, markets-based solution of 
community-level dispute resolution, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses 
of both processes and drawing a conclusion about the best of two imperfect25 
dispute processing mechanisms. The results of the analysis highlight the 
potential efficiency gains that result when these disputes are resolved using 
localized negotiation inspired by Coase and Ellickson.26 
This article offers a new perspective on solar rights and environmental 
dispute resolution, focusing on the community level. The comparative 
institutional analysis27,28 examines a case study, Tesoro del Valle Master 
Homebuilders Association v. Griffin,29 and draws comparisons between the 
enforcement issues associated with statutes and the community dispute 
resolution process. This community dispute resolution process developed 
herein is a local one, in that neighbors would participate and could use 
CC&Rs as preemptory instruments. In addition, local boards or community 
planning organizations could assist with enforcement of solar rights disputes. 
The motivation for the community dispute resolution approach is similar to 
that of alternative dispute resolution processes; those with the best 
                                                
24 See KOMESAR, supra note 9. 
25 See KOMESAR, supra note 9. 
26 See Coase, supra note 2. ELLICKSON, supra note 12. 
27 See KOMESAR, supra note 9. 
28 Joshua. M. Duke and L. A.  Csoboth, Increased Scientific Capacity and Endangered 
Species Management: Lessons from the Red Wolf Conflict, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 539, 
552 (2003) (this article extends the Komesar version of comparative institutional 
analysis). 
29 Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Assn. v. Griffin, 200 Cal. App. 4th 619, 630 
(2011). 
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information (i.e., solar owners and their neighbors) should also be 
incentivized and empowered to lead conflict resolution. The analysis also 
suggests an important hypothesis: that the “insurance policy” provided by 
statutes to solar owners — protecting the value of solar investments — is 
potentially of less value to the property right holder than the certainty of 
market behavior when one considers the failures of the real world’s costly 
enforcement.  
Evan J. Rosenthal30 and others have described the composition of solar 
access laws and their roles in community-level governance. Our argument 
builds upon several scholars, who have argued against the use of the courts in 
enforcing solar rights statutes, citing deficiencies and high inefficiency.31,32 
At the same time, others have argued that common law33,34 and property 
                                                
30 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1006. 
31 See John William Gergacz, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy: Statutory Approaches for 
Access to Sunlight, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 29 (1982) (“Fifth, the Act's reliance 
on the judiciary to resolve disputes may not be the most equitable method. These 
problems are serious deficiencies and point out that California's answer to the issues of 
solar access is far from satisfactory.”). 
32 See Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1265 (2009) (“After a review 
of the judicial developments with respect to nuisance, prescriptive easements, and 
implied easements, it is difficult to imagine that courts could ever become fully engaged 
with the development of a solar rights regime. Even if courts suddenly became receptive 
to solar rights, litigation would be a poor strategy for solar rights seekers for many 
reasons, including the uncertainty of the outcome and the related transaction costs. Rather 
than repeating "ancient" debates about ancient lights and other topics, modern scholars 
should shift their focus away from the courts.”). 
33 See Shawn M. Lyden, An Integrated Approach to Solar Access, 34 Case W. L. Rev. 
367, 368 (1984) (“Unfortunately, the common law affords little or no protection to a 
landowner's interest in access to sunlight. Courts have historically shown great reluctance 
to interfere with land use on the basis of something ‘so impalpable and fleeting as air and 
light.’").  
34 See Scott F. Stromberg, Has the Sun Set on Solar Rights? Examining the Practicality of 
the Solar Rights Act, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 211, 212-13 (2010) (“Unfortunately, the 
common law and express easements adopted in other states have been shown to offer 
little protection to solar users who require access to solar energy. Some courts have been 
unwilling to protect access to solar energy through common law legal theories, due in 
part to the limitation that solar access will place on the development of adjacent 
properties…The failure of common law and express easements to protect solar access 
leaves the solar user without a right to access solar energy and, thereby, discourages its 
implementation.”). 
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law35 poorly process right to light conflicts. Some have also advocated for 
various degrees of involvement of local and municipal governments36,37 in 
inspiring private negotiation of easements, and yet others have discussed the 
role of norms in solar rights disputes.38 This paper builds upon these legal 
analyses, adding a comparative analysis of the underappreciated but critical 
differences in enforcement costs of statutes and transaction costs of 
negotiation. This “cost asymmetry” has important implications for the 
potential role for community governance to play in dispute resolution 
regarding solar installations in master planned communities. As demonstrated 
in the comparative institutional analysis of the Tesoro v. Griffin case 
presented here, the high enforcement costs of statutes raise the possibility that 
the relatively low transaction costs of local negotiation will be the most 
efficient and equitable solution to residential solar rights conflicts. This 
argument therefore brings together three threads of legal analysis: (1) the 
existing literature’s concerns about solar-enforcement, (2) the Coasean39 
notion that private bargains will be superior to mandated, uniform outcomes, 
                                                
35 Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 803, 836 
(2013) (“In these settings, courts and policymakers must be cautious not to unfairly or 
inefficiently redistribute existing property interests in their effort to promote new forms 
of energy development . . . as policymakers seek to adapt property law to the realities of 
the modern energy sector.”). 
36 See Ellis Raskin, The Definitive Guide to Tree Disputes in California, 21 HASTINGS 
W.-N.W. J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 113, 124 (2015). (“Absent any municipal ordinances that 
guarantee otherwise, property owners do not have the right to light and air unobstructed 
by trees. The only exceptions are when the blockage of sunlight is malicious or if the 
trees obstruct a solar easement granted under the Solar Shade Control Act.”). 
37 Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: Climate Change, Natural 
Resource Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 66-67 (2011) 
(“In recent years, state and local governments have in many cases adopted historical 
natural resource development approaches to solar and wind by defining leasehold estates, 
easements, and other property interests in solar and wind rights. … In these efforts, states 
are hoping to spur development and create more certainty in investment…”). 
38 See R. Lisle Baker, My Tree versus Your Solar Collector or Your Well versus My 
Septic System? – Exploring Responses to Beneficial but Conflicting Neighboring Uses of 
Land, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010) (“[R]esolving conflicts between 
neighboring beneficial uses of land would be aided by guidelines which might be 
grounded . . . with a sense that rough justice is being served. Two such norms appear 
helpful: priority in time and examining which of the two beneficial uses appears to be the 
more intrusive . . . .”). 
39 See Coase, supra note 2.  
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and (3) the Elicksonian40 notion that local, informal negotiation may be 
superior to one-size-fits-all standards.  
III. SOLAR RIGHTS STATUTES 
Solar rights statutes establish and delimit the rights of solar owners. There 
are a variety of types of these laws, from acts that prevent solar owners from 
being forced to endure shade, to mechanisms for creating easements to 
enabling statutes for the creation of local ordinances. In some states, these 
statutes provide the framework for solar easements to be contracted between 
two parties.41 Though the solar-owner property rights enumerated are 
substantive, the rights are more limited than some might realize — for 
instance, via CC&Rs. Further, the burden of enforcing these rights largely 
falls upon the owner, despite some instances in the past where the 
government took an active role in enforcement. 
Rosenthal42 recently advanced the literature on understanding solar rights 
statutes. Rosenthal found that, “as of 2012, forty states ha[d] some form of 
solar access law,” twenty-one of which “specifically addressed CC&Rs that 
‘effectively prohibit’ or ‘unreasonably interfere’ with a homeowner’s ability 
to install” a solar system.43 Despite the statutes, little judicial interpretation 
exists; Rosenthal wrote that despite the “323,600 association-governed 
                                                
40 See ELLICKSON, supra note 12.   
41 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 998. (“These laws are diverse in makeup but can provide a 
number of rights and protections, including: the right to install a solar device on a 
property subject to countervailing building codes or local ordinances; the creation of a 
solar easement; and provisions mandating the removal of vegetation that blocks sunlight. 
Twenty-one states have also specifically addressed CC&Rs that ‘effectively prohibit’ or 
‘unreasonably interfere’ with a homeowner's ability to install a solar energy generation 
system.”). 
42 See id. 
43 Id. at 998 (“As of 2012, forty states have some form of solar access law on their books, 
with some local governments taking action as well. These laws are diverse in makeup but 
can provide a number of rights and protections, including: the right to install a solar 
device on a property subject to countervailing building codes or local ordinances; the 
creation of a solar easement; and provisions mandating the removal of vegetation that 
blocks sunlight. Twenty-one states have also specifically addressed CC&Rs that 
‘effectively prohibit’ or ‘unreasonably interfere’ with a homeowner's ability to install a 
solar energy generation system.”). 
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communities in the United States containing some 25.9 million housing 
units” in 2012,44 there is a relatively thin basis of case law featuring 
homeowner versus prohibitive CC&Rs.45 Rosenthal summarized the power 
of CC&Rs: 
Community associations are, to a large extent, right to 
feel so empowered. When a homeowner within a CID wishes 
to undertake a home improvement project — such as a solar 
installation —CC&Rs will often require the homeowner to 
seek prior approval from the association's governing board. 
Courts are highly deferential to the decisions made by these 
boards; many courts apply a form of the business judgment 
rule when assessing an association board's decision. Common 
law principles also strongly favor the enforceability of private 
contractual agreements, including CC&Rs. In the end, as one 
commentator noted, "more than likely, community 
associations will win in court if the family agreed to rules 
when joining a community.”46 
Rosenthal studied these sources of law and made recommendations 
regarding how solar access laws might be strengthened to protect solar rights 
more effectively.47 
This leads to a key point in our article. CC&Rs significantly limit solar 
rights by allowing these rights to be suspended by the community and 
requiring the solar owner to either seek enforcement or defend him or herself 
in court if a CID association seeks to challenge these rights. Further, courts 
have adopted a standard of reasonableness in determining what limitations 
                                                
44 Id. at 1000 (“As of 2012, there were 323,600 association-governed communities in the 
United States containing some 25.9 million housing units.”). 
45 Id. at 1003 (“Despite the board member's warning, there is a scant body of case law 
featuring homeowners seeking judicial approval of a solar project in the face of 
prohibitive CC&Rs and/or an adverse decision by an association board. Homeowners 
may simply abandon plans for a solar device in the face of potential legal hurdles, 
figuring that the up-front costs of installation are substantial enough as is before factoring 
in legal fees, as well (think Henry Homeowner). Others likely realize that any legal 
challenge they could mount faces an uphill battle considering the deference courts give to 
the decisions of community association boards.”). 
46 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 999 (footnotes omitted). 
47 Id. 
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are permissible. This standard is one that better matches a presumptive rights 
regime and nuisance law rather than one where the solar rights have 
ostensibly been allocated via statute.  
Rosenthal argues that the precise and quantifiable definition of 
reasonableness standards and the scope of the law, as well as the elimination 
of provisions for restriction of solar installations on purely aesthetic grounds, 
are necessary to implement effective solar rights legislation on a state level,48 
thereby “divest[ing] the courts, to the greatest extent possible, of their 
discretionary power in analyzing the ‘reasonableness’ of a community 
association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions pertaining to solar 
energy use.”49 Rosenthal suggests that courts are regaining power from 
community associations, which had previously “assumed a function 
traditionally performed by state and local governments.”50  
A. SCOPE OF SOLAR RIGHTS 
The scope of Rosenthal’s article does not include the solar rights granted 
through a parallel class of legislation regarding solar shading, pioneered by 
the California Solar Shade Control Act.51 While shading was perhaps outside 
the scope of his comprehensive review, it is important to note that the term 
“solar rights” can refer to two different sources of conflict: the right to install 
the panels in the first place, and the right to the light necessary for their 
continued performance once installed.52 Installation rights are protected 
under solar rights statutes as well as solar easements, which can be negotiated 
                                                
48 Id. at 1007-09. 
49 Id. at 1017. 
50 Id. at 1008 (“Kristina Caffrey has suggested that in regulating the placement of solar 
devices, community associations have essentially assumed a function traditionally 
performed by state and local governments: ‘All the way back to Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty, state and local governments have told property owners what they can and 
cannot do and where they can or cannot do it.’ Thus, courts could view solar access laws 
as ‘taking back’ the responsibility of zoning and land use planning from community 
associations.”).   
51 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25980-86 (2015). 
52 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 998. 
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between two private parties.53 Performance rights are protected under solar 
shading legislation and local zoning ordinances.   
From the perspective of a solar owner, the necessity for multiple layers of 
protection stems from the multitude of dimensions on which installations can 
vary, in the technical design qualities of the system, incentive policy benefits, 
and other dimensions. In a formal negotiation of these dimensions, a 
document summarizing the negotiated terms along each dimension would 
serve a valuable purpose in creating a legally binding settlement. In the case 
of future judicial dispute, the document could also be introduced as evidence 
in subsequent litigation. Some of these dimensions are laid out in Table 1, a 
sample worksheet table, developed for the purpose of delineating some of the 
potential dimensions for the private negotiation of solar rights disputes 
between neighbors.  
                                                
53 Id. at 999. 
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 Nameplate Capacity of System   
 Number and surface area of panels   
 Location of panels   
 Azimuth (to prevent shading)   
 Degree of Shading (%)   
 SREC benefits   
 Tax Credit benefits   
 Solar rights at the end of system useful life   
 
Solar Easement 
   
 
This table reflects the diversity of potential rights associated with solar, 
but it also presents a preliminary framework for normative recommendations 
on negotiation. Both formal and informal negotiations between neighbors 
could benefit from pre-identified parameters of rights negotiation.  For 
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example, neighbors could use this framework to negotiate side payments 
from the solar owner to homes in viewshed of the system.  Concurrently, 
other neighbors may negotiate the terms of a solar easement in concert with a 
side payment that comes in the form of a fixed proportion of annual energy 
savings, thereby incentivizing the neighbor to maximize sunlight and output 
to the solar owner’s system. 
The initial assignment of these installation rights and performance rights 
to both the solar owner and neighbor come in the form of solar rights 
legislation, local zoning ordinances, solar easements, and CC&Rs.  After 
negotiation, the rights enumerated in the negotiation process become matters 
of enforcement in the case of a violation.  
B. Enforcement 
One of the most important trends in solar rights is the evolution of how 
property rights are enforced. The change in enforcement seems to be 
traceable to a specific, high profile conflict that occurred in Northern 
California in 2008.54  Although the conflict is relatively minor in substance, it 
triggered significant controversial media coverage — most of which raised 
concerns about the criminal prosecution of “developed” uses, which in this 
case were redwood trees.  In California prior to 2008, the Solar Shade 
Control Act55 was enforced as a public nuisance carrying criminal 
misdemeanor charges.  In 2008, in California v. Bissett,56 a tree owner 
refused to trim or remove trees that were shading a neighbor’s solar panels.  
The public and media reaction seems to have led to an amendment to the 
Solar Shade Act, as summarized by Day Anders and Adi Kuduk, that 
considered violations a private nuisance requiring civil (rather than criminal) 
enforcement:  
 “Before the Act’s amendment became effective on January 1, 
2009, solar collector owners seeking to enforce the Act had to 
have their claims prosecuted by a district attorney or other 
prosecutor. This entailed demonstrating to the prosecutor that 
a violation occurred, having the prosecutor deliver a thirty-
                                                
54 See Barringer, supra note 6. 
55 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25980-86 (2015). 
56 California v. Bissett, No. BB727255 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Santa Clara County Mar. 28, 2008). 
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day abatement notice to the offending tree or shrub owner to 
cure the violation, and finally prosecuting this person if the 
violation was not abated within thirty days.  
Now that violations of the Act are no longer 
criminally prosecuted, the solar collector owner is solely 
responsible for enforcing the protections afforded by the Act. 
This is essentially a two-step process. First, the affected solar 
collector owner must provide the tree or shrub owner written 
notice requesting compliance with the requirements of 
Section 25982. Second, if the tree or shrub owner fails to 
comply with the written notice requesting compliance with 
the Act, the affected solar collector owner may bring a private 
nuisance suit under the Act against the negligent person to 
remedy the solar shading.”57 
In sum, this excerpt shows that, with respect to to the right to be free from 
shading, the burden of enforcement shifted from the public to the private 
solar owner. 
While California has led the way in adopting solar rights legislation, the 
frontier for the enforcement of solar rights is evolving and relatively 
unexplored.  To the skeptic, it might seem as though legislatures assigned 
these solar rights with good intentions, but were not prepared to pay for the 
costs of enforcing the law.  Some statutes were not written with an explicit 
enforcement role for the state, though others were.  Currently, states are 
pursuing one of the following strategies: (1) not enforcing solar rights; (2) 
under-enforcing solar rights; (3) shifting enforcement burden to local 
governments; or (4) shifting the enforcement burden to private parties. 
Although these strategies lower the state government’s fiscal costs, the cost 
of enforcement must be paid nonetheless.  The owners of solar property 
rights will either see costs of asserting and defending their rights, or they will 
choose to not defend their rights at all — which is also costly.  If they choose 
to use the courts for enforcement, then that also imposes a social cost. 
                                                
57 Scott Anders et. al., ‘Hey, Your Tree is Shading My Solar Panels:’ California’s Solar 
Shade Control Act, 2 J. SUSTAINABLE REAL EST. 361, 368 (2010). 
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No empirical literature could be identified indicating recent trends in 
enforcement of solar rights.  Thus, the authors conducted a brief and non-
representative set of phone contacts to state and local governments in 
California.58  The contacts showed that many local governments do not have 
experience with the enforcement of solar rights conflicts and, therefore, are 
not taking an active role in pursuing enforcement.  The phone conversations 
suggest that it is likely that most of these disputes are being settled privately 
between neighbors, outside the realm of government intervention — though 
perhaps through judicial resolution.  In many states with strong solar rights 
legislation, including California, property rights are clearly defined. 
Moreover, in private negotiation transactions costs are relatively low, and 
therefore Coasean59 outcomes through bargaining are possible.  
Another critical piece in the analysis of statutes is the high enforcement 
costs for the judicial dispute resolution of statutorily assigned rights — i.e., 
litigation costs.  These costs are likely very high, relative to the solar and 
development values at stake, so it is not surprising that one finds little 
appellate case law in this area.60  Governments could, but do not seem to, 
actively police some of these conflicts. One could imagine the analog of a 
building code inspector, enforcing violations. While the violation of solar 
rights statutes has rarely been a criminal act, their enforcement, generally 
through judicial dispute resolution processes, remains very costly. Without 
government representation of their interests, these costs fall on the 
disadvantaged party, i.e., the party that is losing in the status quo. There is a 
significant asymmetry in the costs of formal legal action and self-
enforcement, and there is an inherent bias towards the status quo, be it one in 
which solar panel owners threaten the developed use, or vice versa. These 
                                                
58 Addendum available upon request (on file with Benjamin Attia, Univ. of Del.). 
59 See Coase, supra note 2. 
60 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 999 (“Considering the deferential treatment community 
associations receive in the courts, the importance of solar access laws becomes clear--
without them, homeowners face nearly impossible odds when challenging the adverse 
decision of an association board. But can solar access laws turn the tide in favor of 
homeowners? Despite the spread of statutes addressing solar rights, little case law 
involving homeowners pitted against their associations has developed, perhaps due to 
homeowners deciding to abandon their efforts rather than potentially face litigation. Solar 
access laws are also a relatively recent phenomenon. However, several cases indicate that 
courts will carefully scrutinize the language of solar access laws in determining how they 
impact a traditional review of an association board's decision. Statutory construction of 
these laws is thus of critical importance.”). 
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cost asymmetries will likely lead to substantive inefficiency, and our 
normative recommendations seeks to lower these costs with a community 
dispute resolution process. 
IV. DECENTRALIZED CONFLICT RESOLUTION: ELLICKSONIAN 
NORMS AND COASEAN BARGAINING 
Because solar rights disputes are spatially localized — involving a small 
number of solar owners and neighbors — the most applicable decentralized 
resolution processes are Ellicksonian norms61 and Coasean bargaining.62 This 
section briefly outlines how these processes function, focusing on the costs of 
conflict resolution. These resolution costs may then be compared to the 
enforcement costs of statutes. 
 
The theory behind efficient Coasean bargaining relies on a precondition 
— the assignment of property rights to either the solar party or the 
developed-use party.63 Solar rights statutes existed in forty states in 2012, 
largely in the form of a lesser right in land that mirrors a negative easement.64 
The assignment of rights is often quite precise and varied. For example, a 
statute might specify that no more than 10 percent of a solar panel may be 
shaded between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on the winter solstice 
as long as the solar panel was installed before the shade-producing developed 
use.65 This statute would therefore assign a negative easement whereby the 
developed-use property is encumbered, such that the shading use of land 
would not be pursued.  
These conflicting land uses fall along a spectrum of rights, with extremes 
favoring vertical development or solar rights (see Figure 1). When rights are 
completely assigned to vertical development, such as in the Fontainbleau66 
case, there is no statutory protection for solar rights or to prevent solar 
                                                
61 See ELLICKSON, supra note 12. 
62 See Coase, supra note 2.  
63 Id. 
64 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 998. 
65 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25982 (2015). 
66 See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1959).  
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shading. Conversely, the opposite spectral extreme holds for absolute solar 
rights over vertical development, fully protecting the stream of benefits from 
solar panels. Although many might anticipate that solar statutes award 
absolute rights, this is not the case. In most states with solar rights, these 
statutes have created a solar rights-leaning regime with reasonableness 
standards and other disputatious protections. The solar rights regime’s 
location along the spectrum can be influenced by the types of dispute 
resolution processes taking place and by the costliness of enforcing one’s 
solar rights.  
 
Figure 1: Solar Rights Spectrum 
Conflict arises when vertical development is perceived to be 
unreasonable to the solar owner; in Figure 1, conflict would be a land-use 
decision resulting in a point to the left of where the solar owner believes his 
or her rights reside. A solar owner could seek government help to enforce his 
or her rights by limiting the developed land use, which in Figure 1 would 
mean seeking to shift the presumptive activity to the right. However, this 
centralized enforcement may be expensive, relative to the value of the shift 
right in Figure 1. Our hypothesis is that the shift could be accomplished 
through decentralized private negotiation at a lower cost. Alternately, the 
developed use owner could compensate the solar owner sufficiently to remain 
at or near the left-most status quo point. 
With property rights assigned, the next step in a Coasean analysis is to 
assess transaction costs.67 Transaction costs involve the resources expended 
to reach a formal agreement, whereby (1) the developed-use owner pays the 
solar owner to endure more shading or (2) the solar owner pays the 
                                                
67 Id. at 850-53; Duke, supra note 5; see also, Joshua M. Duke, Institutions and Land-Use 
Conflicts: Harm, Dispute Processing, and Transactions, 38 J. Econ. Issues. 227, 234 
(2004). 
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developed-use owner to provide more sun than currently provided.68 For 
instance, the contract might specify that the shade will be less than 10 percent 
during the given hours or the shade will apply to fewer hours than the statute 
specifies. Examples of transaction costs would be the costs of paying a 
lawyer to draft a contract, filing documents, negotiating the price, and 
enforcing the contract.69  
The next step in a Coasean70 analysis is to compare the magnitude of the 
total transaction costs to the potential gain from trade,71 which in this case 
would be the value of the adjustments specified above. For several reasons, it 
is reasonable to anticipate that in most conflicts, the transaction costs will 
exceed the value of the adjustments. First, although the solar panels and 
developed uses are valuable (i.e., of a magnitude greater than $10,000), the 
value of the potential gains from trade will often be less because they 
involved only adjustments to the rights specified in the statutes. Second, the 
transaction costs are likely to be substantial (i.e., at least $1,000-$2,000) 
because of the professional services that are likely to be involved. 
Collectively, this Coasean analysis suggests that bargaining can deliver the 
efficient level in the developed-use-versus-solar balance,72 but it is likely in 
most conflicts that the status quo statutorily assigned property rights would 
prevail.  
Because the principal obstacle to bargaining is transaction costs, one 
might hypothesize that informal, norms-driven outcomes may be at play. 
Simply, the costs of reaching an informal agreement are likely to be less than 
the formal-agreement transaction costs. The informal agreement costs would 
involve private (and likely, bilateral) negotiation, but no contracting cost. The 
main cost of informal agreements would be the costs to the victim of seeking 
redress, if the other party violates the informal agreement. The costs are 
analogous to contractual enforcement costs, and occur only in expectation. If 
the negotiation is upheld, then these are highly efficient, privately negotiated 
transactions that likely involve low or near-zero transactions costs, and likely 
                                                
68 Coase, supra note 2, at 15-19; See Duke, supra note 5. 
69 Coase, supra note 2, at 15-19; See Duke, supra note 5. 
70 See Coase, supra note 2. 
71 See Duke, supra note 5; Duke, supra note 67, at 234. 
72 See Duke, supra note 5; Duke, supra note 67, at 234. 
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do not involve formal easement contracts. It is possible that these informal 
agreements involve private side payments or exchanged services.  
There is legal-economic theory to support these informal negotiations as 
an alternative to Coasean bargaining. Norms, as a field of conflict resolution, 
largely draw on Ellickson’s work Order Without Law.73 After conducting 
field research with farmers and ranchers in Shasta County, California, 
Ellickson concluded that bargaining contexts that exist outside of legal 
entitlement to initial rights create superior efficiency gains in private 
negotiation.74 In fact, Ellickson juxtaposes his views with the “legal centrist 
tradition,” pioneered by Thomas Hobbes,75 who argued that a non-legal 
system of social control—“such as the decentralized enforcement of 
norms”76—had no possibility of bringing order to a society. Coasean 
arguments align with Hobbes’s, arguing that initial rights must be assigned 
by the state.77 Ellickson disagrees: “Even in the parts of his article where he 
took transactions costs into account, Coase failed to note that in some 
contexts initial rights might arise through decentralized social processes, 
rather than from law.”78 In an Ellicksonian world, there are two forms of 
norms-based negotiation: those contexts in which initial rights are centrally 
defined and those contexts in which they are not defined.79 When they are not 
defined, it is likely that decentralized social processes often determine initial 
rights. When they are defined, private bargaining likely often occurs outside 
of legal entitlement to those initial rights. Ellickson argues that due to the 
power of social norms and the complexities of the law, many will choose to 
enforce their own express contracts without the help of the law.80  
Both Coasean bargaining and Ellicksonian norms could potentially work 
to resolve solar rights enforcement conflicts. With property rights defined, 
                                                
73 See ELLICKSON, supra note 12. 
74 Id. at viii (“In short, contrary to standard law-and-economics analysis, in many 
contexts legal entitlements do not function as starting points for bargaining.”). 
75 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 97-98, 110-113 (1st ed. 1909). 
76 ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 138. 
77 Coase, supra note 2, at 15. 
78 ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 139. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 138; See also Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in 
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981). 
 
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 1 
 
23 
status quo rights assignment will often prevail, but when it is unsatisfactory 
to one party, that party will seek an informal or formal outcome if no other, 
cheaper resolution process is available. It is also possible, however, that the 
parties to the conflict may (1) not fully understand the exact property rights 
assigned and whether they are in compliance, or (2) will ignore the assigned 
rights seeking an entirely norm-based solution. In other words, solar rights 
form an important variable in negotiation with which the costs and benefits of 
adjustments to the status quo are negotiated. Enforcement through courts, 
though likely intended as the resolution process by those in government, may 
actually be far less attractive when compared to the net benefits of using 
decentralized processes.  
If the government enforces solar rights with criminal actions — as 
California did prior to 2008 under the Solar Shade Act — then there is little 
incentive for solar owners to use private negotiation because the state bears 
the enforcement cost. That is the exception, however. As most statutes simply 
assign rights and then direct aggrieved solar owners to seek civil redress in 
courts at their own expense, private negotiation processes have potentially 
lower cost. This hypothesis is difficult to test empirically. It is largely an 
unobservable phenomenon of private negotiation. Yet, the theoretical 
predictions suggest that it is currently used to resolve conflicts. Further, the 
government should redirect solar conflicts from courts to a facilitated private 
negotiation process, which is built upon by the Coasean81 and Ellicksonian82 
insights developed herein. In the following comparative institutional analysis, 
lessons are drawn about how a community dispute resolution process 
functions and compares to the litigated resolution in the case.  
V. CASE STUDY: TESORO DEL VALLE MASTER HOMEOWNER’S 
ASSOCIATION V. MARTIN GRIFFIN ET AL. 
This comparative institutional analysis of the conflict leading to the case 
of Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowner’s Association v. Griffin83 follows 
                                                
81 See Coase, supra note 2.   
82 See ELLICKSON, supra note 12.   
83 See Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Association v. Martin Griffin, 200 Cal. 
App. 4th 619 (2011). 
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methods developed by Komesar84 and extended by Duke,85 seeking to 
determine the most effective resolution process to solve a specific type of 
environmental conflict. By collecting “transaction” data86 adapting an 
approach developed by John R. Commons and elaborated upon by Daniel W. 
Bromley,87 the researchers analyzed how a resource at stake is assigned 
formal property rights from an informal to fully formal property rights 
regime. Comparing the effectiveness of these allocation procedures 
concludes which processes are the “best of the bads” of available resolution 
processes.88  
This analysis compares the legislative process in terms of its passage and 
enforcement of the California Solar Rights Act89 to the community dispute 
resolution process in terms of both the disputants’ procedural ability to 
participate and the substantive efficiency of the outcome. This allows 
conclusions to be drawn about how to use these resolution processes to 
achieve societal goals. This case study provides insight into a unique new 
category of resolution processes that have the potential to increase 
substantive efficiency in community-level solar conflicts. This analysis finds 
that the community dispute resolution process is potentially relatively 
effective in creating what is essentially a negotiated settlement that occurs 
with low transaction costs. This finding has wide implications for 
environmental policy because it represents the power of private negotiation in 
resolving environmental conflicts. 
A. Setting of the Conflict 
The conflict setting establishes the history of human interaction with the 
natural environment in the location that would eventually produce the case 
study conflict. This conflict is set in the city of Santa Clarita, California.90 
                                                
84 See KOMESAR, supra note 9. 
85 See Duke, supra note 5. 
86 Id. 
87 John R. Commons, Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy, New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers (1990). See also John R. Commons, Legal 
Foundations of Capitalism, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers (1995); Daniel 
W. Bromley, Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations of Public 
Policy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1989).  
88 See KOMESAR, supra note 9. 
89 Cal. Civ. Code § 714 (2015). 
90 See Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Association v. Martin Griffin, 200 Cal. 
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With a population of about 180,000, and a median household income of 
$82,607,91 Santa Clarita is a vibrant and wealthy suburb of Los Angeles 
situated in the northeast corner of Los Angeles County. The Santa Clarita 
Valley has a mild Southern California Mediterranean climate, characterized 
by warm and dry days most of the year with mild-moist winters.92 
Throughout the valley, microclimates are common because of the proximity 
to the Mojave Desert and Pacific Ocean, and the dry portion of fall usually 
yields temperatures near 100 degrees and vulnerability to wildfires.93 The 
city has a rich history steeped in early American Indians, the California Gold 
Rush, the oil boom, a disastrous flood, and the early silent film era.  
B. Parties and Conflicting Interests 
The homes in the Tesoro del Valle development, like most other master-
planned communities, are subject to the community’s CC&Rs.94 The CC&Rs 
ensure that “there shall be no construction, alteration, or removal of any 
Improvement in the Project (other than repairs or rebuilding done by the 
Association pursuant hereto) without the approval of the Architectural 
Control Committee (ACC).”95 The CC&R’s “Design Guidelines” adopted by 
the Tesoro del Valle homeowners association reserved their right under the 
California Solar Rights Act96 to impose “reasonable” restrictions on solar 
installations, pending review from the homeowner’s association’s ACC.97  
                                                                                                                     
App. 4th 619 (2011).  
91 2010 U.S. Census. U.S. Census Bureau, available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/0669088.html. 




94 G. C. Hansen, California Planning and Development Report (Legal Digest No. Vol. 27 
No. 1, 2012), http://www.cp-dr.com/node/3100 (last visited September 21, 2014)  (“In 
Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Assn. v. Griffin, defendants Martin and Carolyn 
Griffin were owners of property who sought to install a solar energy system at their 
residence in a development that is subject to conditions, covenants and restrictions”). 
95 Id. (“The CC&Rs provided that ‘[t]here shall be no construction, alteration, or removal 
of any Improvement in the Project (other than repairs or rebuilding done by the 
Association pursuant hereto) without the approval of the Architectural Control 
Committee (ACC).’”). 
96 See Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Association v. Martin Griffin, 200 Cal. 
 
NEGOTIATED SOLAR RIGHTS CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
26 
In 2007, defendants Martin and Carolyn Griffin decided to install a solar 
PV renewable energy system on their property, which activated the conflict 
in this case.98 Because the use of land for solar purposes involved a more 
technologically advanced and intensive use, the Griffins are the “high-
intensity user” according to the typology developed by Duke.99,100,101 
Tesoro’s ACC requires submission of a plot plan drawn to scale, a detailed 
description of the proposed materials, a landscape plan, and a drainage plan 
in order to review proposed property modification projects.102 The Griffins 
submitted what was determined to be an inadequate application, which 
contained “only a handwritten drawing with a rectangle signifying the 
approximate location of the proposed solar panels; it did not contain 
information concerning the panels' dimensions, number, or color; the setback; 
the proposed alterations to the landscaping; or the amount of electricity 
proposed to be generated.”103 The ACC did not approve the application, but 
suggested that the roof of the casita adjacent to the home could be a potential 
location for the proposed panels.  Further, the ACC requested the missing 
elements to the application, including the “project’s dimensions and 
minimum setbacks on the site plan, how the slope beneath the solar panels 
                                                                                                                     
App. 4th 619 (2011). 
97 D. Praw & M. Laufer, Testing the Limits of the California Solar Act (April 18, 2012), 
(“The homes in Tesoro del Valle are governed by a homeowners association.  The HOA, 
through its CC&Rs, imposes certain customary restrictions on the homeowners that 
protect the community and maintain architectural consistency.”). 
98 Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Association v. Martin Griffin, 200 Cal. App. 
4th 619, 623 (2011) (“In 2007, appellants met with Joe Hawley, then with Advanced 
Solar Electric, who gave them a proposal for the installation of a solar energy system for 
their property. They told Hawley they were interested in the system being installed on the 
slope adjacent to their residence. Appellants submitted an application to install a solar 
energy system on October 2, 2007.”). 
99 See Duke, supra note 67. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Tesoro at 624 (2011) (“The CC&Rs and Design Guidelines listed the requirements for 
an application to the ACC, which included the submission of a plot plan drawn to scale, a 
detailed description of the proposed materials, a landscape plan and a drainage plan.”). 
103 Id. (“The Griffins’ application to the ACC for the solar system in this case did not 
meet those requirements. Their application contained only a handwritten drawing with a 
rectangle signifying the approximate location of the proposed solar panels; it did not 
contain information concerning the panels' dimensions, number or color; the setback; the 
proposed alterations to the landscaping; or the amount of electricity proposed to be 
generated.”). 
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would be maintained, and photographs of the existing landscape and 
superimpose the proposed panel elevation.”104 The ACC denied the proposed 
slope-mounted system because: (1) it was at the entry to the neighborhood; 
(2) adjacent homes had a direct line of sight; and (3) the CC&R’s prohibited 
slope alteration and any alteration or landscape removal that could impact 
drainage.105 
Tesoro’s ACC anticipated that the Griffins would submit a revised 
application, however, the Griffins instead proceeded with the roof-installed 
panels by signing a $97,000 contract with Advanced Solar Electric for the 
installation of a 36-panel array on the roof of the home and the 22-panel 
slope-mounted array.106,107 Then, after a meeting with the ACC, they 
submitted a revised application for the entire project.108 The ACC reapproved 
                                                
104 Id. at 625 (“Summarizing the ACC’s position, Tim Collins handwrote four comments 
on appellants’ application noting that the roof of the casita adjacent to appellants’ 
residence should be considered as a location for the panels; that the project’s dimensions 
and minimum setbacks needed to be provided on the site plan; that appellants needed to 
indicate how the slope beneath the solar panels would be maintained; and that they 
needed to submit photographs of the existing landscape and superimpose the proposed 
panel elevation.”). 
105 Id. (“The ACC was concerned about the proposed slope-mounted system because it 
was at the entry to the neighborhood, adjacent homes had a direct line of sight, the 
CC&R’s prohibited slope alteration and any alteration or landscape removal could impact 
drainage.”).   
106 Pat Murphy, Solar Energy Enthusiasts Take on Homeowners Association, and Lose | 
Benchmarks, LAWYERS USA ONLINE (November 3, 2011), 
http://lawyersusaonline.com/benchmarks/2011/11/03/solar-energy-enthusiasts-take-on-
homeowners-association-and-lose/ (“So, despite the association’s protests, the work 
started on the installation of the solar energy system. The contractor completed 
installation of the entire system – including the solar panels on the slope – by the end of 
March 2008.”). 
107 Jon E. Goetz, Homeowners Association Has Broad Discretion To Regulate 
Homeowner Installation Of Solar Panels, MARTINDALE (November 15, 2011),  
http://www.martindale.com/energy/article_Kronick-Moskovitz-Tiedemann-Girard-
A_1374518.htm (“The Griffins decided to install 36 solar panels on their roof and 22 
panels on the slope and signed a contract for installation prior to receiving approval from 
the HOA…The Griffins began construction despite the HOA Board’s denial of their 
application.”). 
108 Tesoro at 626 (2011) (“Following a January 23, 2008 meeting between appellants, 
Hawley, and Tesoro and Euclid Management representatives, appellants agreed to submit 
a revised application and Tesoro agreed to review and rule on the application within one 
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the roof installation on the new application but again denied the slope 
installation.109 The Griffins installed the slope-mounted panels in spite of the 
denied application, instigating the lawsuit brought by Tesoro’s homeowner’s 
association seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.110  
The resource at stake is the use of air and sunlight above the Griffins’ 
private home as well as the slope on their private property in the Tesoro 
subdivision. The high-intensity use, the installation of the solar array on the 
roof and on the slope adjacent to the house, triggered conflict because it is 
seen to be causing an aesthetic disamenity to the neighbors — who the 
homeowner’s association represents.111 The disamenity involves glare and 
unsightliness of the solar array, lowering the neighbor’s enjoyment of their 
property. This disamenity, as well as the potential resulting reductions in 
property values borne by the neighbors resulting from the installation of the 
solar array, have the hallmarks of an externality, or shifted cost, borne by the 
neighbors in the Tesoro community when the Griffins install the solar array. 
The Griffins’ interests perhaps stemmed from the desire to reduce their 
carbon footprint and their dependence on the utility company, perhaps net 
metering benefits, and to make a long-run financial return on their $97,000 
investment. These interests, though many would consider them noble, impose 
an external cost on Tesoro. Nevertheless, to restrain the Griffins would result 
in costs being borne by them. 
                                                                                                                     
week. The supplemental application added the installation of solar panels on the roof.”). 
109 Id. (“On January 29, 2008, the ACC denied the supplemental application in part, 
specifically disapproving the installation of solar panels on the slope and directing 
appellants to return the slope to its original condition. The ACC remained concerned 
about the same issues that led to the denial of the initial application, including that 
appellants had not considered alternative locations.”).   
110 California Court Upholds Solar Energy Restrictions of Homeowners Association, 
(September 21, 2014), http://www.environmental-law.net/2012/01/california-court-
upholds-solar-energy-restrictions-of-homeowners-association/ (“However, the ACC 
rejected the application and ordered the defendants to restore the slope outside its 
perimeter wall. Tesoro subsequently a filed a lawsuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief.”). 
111 The property owners, as well as all people who receive direct and existence benefits 
from knowing that this particular home is powered by renewable energy rather than 
conventional power, henceforth known as “the Griffins,” are the high-intensity user of the 
resource at stake. 
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Tesoro is comprised of the Griffins’ neighbors in the Tesoro del Valle 
community and is represented by the Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowner’s 
Association and its respective committees. Tesoro is the low-intensity user, 
seeking to maintain the airspace and sunlight above the home and the slope in 
the condition created by the initial construction of the development and, 
thereby, to prevent the solar array from being installed.  
According to the opinion handed down by Court of Appeals Judge, 
Randy Rhodes, “Tesoro is a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation that 
manages, administers, maintains, preserves and operates the residences and 
common areas in the Tesoro community.”112 In doing so, the homeowner’s 
association established and enforces the CC&Rs, with the stated purpose to 
“enhance and protect the value, desirability and attractiveness of the Tesoro 
community.”113 These interests of the homeowner’s association represent the 
interests of the residents of the Tesoro del Valle community, as they seek the 
same ends for their own private property in the community.  
Tesoro’s constituency seeks to coordinate the ways that other members of 
the community are able to enjoy land uses and modifications to their real 
property in order to maintain property values. Uncoordinated uses would 
likely give rise to external costs. These external costs can create a disamenity 
and lower neighboring property values, as well as cause the overall 
community’s value to decline due to a lack of coordination in use and future 
expectations of use.  
In this conflict, Tesoro is seeking to limit the aesthetic externality the 
Griffins’ solar installation imposed on neighbors. Pursuant to the California 
Solar Rights Act,114 Tesoro’s CC&Rs reiterate in Section 8.1.18 that all 
property modifications must be approved by the ACC.115 Specifically relating 
to the rules on slopes on different properties, the CC&Rs state that “no 
structure, planting, fencing, . . . [may] interfere with established slope ratios, 
create erosion or sliding problems, or which may change the direction of flow 
of drainage channels or obstruct or retard the flow of water through drainage 
                                                
112 Tesoro, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 623. 
113 Id. at 623. 
114 Cal. Civ. Code § 714 (2015). 
115 Tesoro, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 623. 
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channels.”116 This clause assigns the right to Tesoro to regulate the specific 
listed elements of the Griffins’ stream of benefits. The conflict stems from 
the inherent legal conflict between the institutions created by the California 
Solar Rights Act and the CC&Rs in the Tesoro community. Due to its vague 
technical nature, it is unlikely that the “reasonableness” clause in the 
California Solar Rights Act117 had yet been tested before this case.  
VI. THE COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS METHOD 
The environmental transactions data presented below are an analytical 
method developed by Duke, building on Bromley and Commons, that 
dovetails with the comparative institutional analysis methodology developed 
by Komesar.118,119 The analysis evaluates highly imperfect conflict resolution 
processes on their relative ability to achieve social goals, such as fairness and 
efficiency.120,121 This article defines fairness in terms of ability to participate, 
while efficiency is the substantive efficiency of the outcome. The ability to 
participate includes the opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision 
maker. Substantive efficiency requires that the property rights at stake be 
allocated to the highest and best use, or social efficiency. In this article, 
where all affected parties’ interests are collected into two disputing parties, 
resource allocation efficiency is achieved when the property rights at stake 
are allocated to the highest valued user.122  
The comparative institutional analysis methodology also incorporates 
Komesar’s “participation-centered approach,” which analyzes the “benefits 
and costs of participation” in the conflict resolution process and each party’s 
ability to bear the costs.123 Some of these costs may include “average per 
capita stakes, information costs, contracting costs, enforcement costs, 
                                                
116 Id. at 623. 
117 Cal. Civ. Code § 714(b) (2015). 
118 See KOMESAR, supra note 9; Commons, supra note 87; Bromley, supra note 87. 
119 Id. 
120 See KOMESAR, supra note 9. 
121 See KOMESAR, supra note 9; Duke & Csoboth, supra note 28, at 551 (“Comparative 
institutional analysis requires the assessment of the performance of each resolution 
process in terms of its ability to achieve social goals relative to the performance of other 
processes. Social goals are typically dichotomized as fairness and efficiency.”). 
122 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 28, at 585. 
123 See KOMESAR, supra note 9.     
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organizational costs, group cohesiveness, sophistication, wealth, and number 
of members in each party.”124 The participation-centered approach will be 
discussed in further detail below.  
Seeking to determine which resolution process is the “best of the 
bads,”125 this analysis will compare legislative action in the form of the 
California Solar Rights Act126 to the hybrid resolution process that is part 
alternative dispute resolution and part market process.  This hybrid process 
will be termed a community dispute resolution process, which will enforce 
the contractually binding CC&Rs of the Tesoro del Valle Master 
Homeowner’s Association. The legislative action in California protecting the 
property rights of homeowners wishing to purchase a solar installation is 
dealt a serious blow by the appellate decision in this case, as the 
homeowner’s association’s ACC (here, the vehicle of the community dispute 
resolution process) undercuts the authority of the California Solar Rights 
Act’s standards of reasonableness.127 These two dispute resolution processes 
juxtapose the power of top-down institutional power and bottom-up 
negotiation as methods to bring about conflict resolution over solar rights in a 
cost-effective manner. 
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSACTIONS DATA 
In order to perform the comparative institutional analysis, data were 
collected to delineate the environmental transactions128 that occurred over the 
resource at stake. These transactions contain events that conditionally assign 
rights to the conflicting interest parties; the parties to the conflict enter the 
Hohfeldian129 formal rights regime when conditional rights have been 
assigned.130 These transactions begin before the resource conflict emerged 
(nonactivation), and continue until the ultimate formal property rights 
                                                
124 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 28, at 553.   
125 See KOMESAR, supra note 9.     
126 Cal. Civ. Code § 714(b) (2015). 
147 Id. 
128 Duke, supra note 67, at 230. 
129 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
130 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 28, at 572. 
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assignment. Each of these transactions consists of a resolution process, a 
transaction issue, and a conditional rights outcome.131 
Prior to 1978, when the first solar rights were assigned in California,132 
the resource at stake was not yet activated. In other words, the developed-use 
versus solar access conflict did not exist, as there was nothing to stop either 
party from pursuing their desired use of the resource. This is a Hohfeldian 
presumptive property rights regime;133,134 in economic terms, the resource at 
stake has no value — i.e., is not scarce by default.135 The conflict issue in this 
market-based transaction is whether either party will act on a Hohfeldian 
privilege136, 137 to engage in high-intensity use of the resource at stake. In 
these pre-statute years, neither the Griffins’ predecessor in interest nor the 
predecessors in interest of the neighbors pursued use of the resource at stake.  
In 1978, the California State Assembly passed the California Solar Rights 
Act.138 The legislation was designed to protect the rights of homeowners in 
master-planned communities to install solar photovoltaic energy systems on 
their property: 
(a) Any covenant, restriction, or condition contained 
in any deed, contract, security instrument, or other instrument 
affecting the transfer or sale of, or any interest in, real 
property that effectively prohibits or restricts the installation 
or use of a solar energy system is void and unenforceable. 139  
                                                
131 Id. at 563. 
132 Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Association v. Martin Griffin, 200 Cal. App. 
4th 619, 625 (2011). 
133 See Bromley, supra note 87. 
134 See Hohfeld, supra note 148. 
135 Duke, supra note 67, at 247. 
136 See Bromley, supra note 87. 
137 Hohfeld, supra note 129, at 29. 
138 Cal. Civ. Code § 714 (2015). 
139 Id. at §  714(a) (“For photovoltaic systems that comply with state and federal law, 
‘significantly’ means an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) over the 
system cost as originally specified and proposed, or a decrease in system efficiency of an 
amount exceeding 10 percent as originally specified and proposed.”). Id. at § 
714(d)(1)(B) (2015). 
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This Act does allow the CC&Rs to include provisions that impose 
“reasonable” restrictions on installations, which are defined in Section 
714 of California Civil Code as those that do not increase the cost or 
decrease the energy efficiency of the system by more than 20 percent.140 
The statute’s  language on reasonableness reads: 
(b) This section does not apply to provisions that impose 
reasonable restrictions on solar energy systems. However, it 
is the policy of the state to promote and encourage the use of 
solar energy systems and to remove obstacles thereto. 
Accordingly, reasonable restrictions on a solar energy system 
are those restrictions that do not significantly increase the cost 
of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency or 
specified performance, or that allow for an alternative system 
of comparable cost, efficiency, and energy conservation 
benefits. 
and 
Notwithstanding Section 714, any association, as defined in 
Section 1351, may impose reasonable provisions which: 
(a) Restrict the installation of solar energy systems installed 
in common areas, as defined in Section 1351, to those 
systems approved by the association. 
(b) Require the owner of a separate interest, as defined in 
Section 1351, to obtain the approval of the association for the 
installation of a solar energy system in a separate interest 
owned by another. 
(c) Provide for the maintenance, repair, or replacement of 
roofs or other building components. 
                                                
140 Id. at § 714(b) (“For photovoltaic systems that comply with state and federal law, 
‘significantly’ means an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) over the 
system cost as originally specified and proposed, or a decrease in system efficiency of an 
amount exceeding 10 percent as originally specified and proposed.”); Id. at § 
714(d)(1)(B) (2015). 
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(d) Require installers of solar energy systems to indemnify or 
reimburse the association or its members for loss or damage 
caused by the installation, maintenance, or use of the solar 
energy system.141 
These benchmarks create significant property rights for solar 
owners and place corresponding duties on neighbors (represented by the 
homeowner’s associations). The California Solar Rights Act142 created an 
adjudicative process for solar owners to overcome restrictions in the 
homeowners associations’ CC&Rs and to install solar PV systems on 
their homes in homeowners’ association-regulated communities. In 
allowing for reasonable restrictions at the twenty percent mark, the Act 
strongly favors assignment of property rights to solar owners. One key 
aspect of the Act involves enforcement: 
(e) Whenever approval is required for the installation or 
use of a solar energy system, the application for approval 
shall be processed and approved by the appropriate 
approving entity in the same manner as an application for 
approval of an architectural modification to the property, 
and shall not be willfully avoided or delayed. 
(f) Any entity, other than a public entity, that willfully 
violates this section shall be liable to the applicant or 
other party for actual damages occasioned thereby, and 
shall pay a civil penalty to the applicant or other party in 
an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000). 
(g) In any action to enforce compliance with this section, 
the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
(h) (1) A public entity that fails to comply with this 
section may not receive funds from a state-sponsored 
grant or loan program for solar energy. A public entity 
shall certify its compliance with the requirements of this 
                                                
141 9.2 Cal. Civ. Code § 714 and 714.1. 
142 Id. 
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section when applying for funds from a state-sponsored 
grant or loan program.143 
The enforcement language of the California Solar Rights Act is vague, 
passing the burden of specific enforcement procedures on to local 
governments. As was detailed above, the brief and non-representative set of 
phone contacts made to state and local governments in California144 implied 
that few local governments have experience with the enforcement of solar 
rights, and it is apparent that they have not interpreted the vague language of 
the California Solar Rights Act145 to handle enforcement. This suggests it is 
likely that any disputes of this nature are settled privately.  
In addition to this principal statute, there are several other statutes in 
California assigning property rights to solar owners. There are solar easement 
laws, local zoning enabling legislation for solar protection, and the 
aforementioned solar shading law.146 Following the legislation, several other 
transactions occurred that affected the conflict.  
In 1996,147 the former 1,795-acre Clougherty Ranch, now owned by 
Montalvo Properties, was re-zoned for residential development. This was a 
local legislative transaction in the form of zoning allocated property rights 
with the intention of controlling and directing the use of property within 
Santa Clarita County. The purpose of zoning is to ensure that residential, 
commercial, and industrial property uses remain separate to minimize 
externalities between different categories of land use. This zoning decision 
specifically allowed the developer, Montalvo Properties, to develop the land 
into a CID. In terms of market value, this developed use is undoubtedly of 
greater marketed net benefits than the ranch’s use; but it is probably the 
highest-valued social use of the property, too. This only has an indirect effect 
on the resource at stake because the development that results from this zoning 
leads the slope and its sunlight to become scarce. There is no clear rights 
allocation loser in this situation.  
                                                
143 Id. at § 714(e)(1), (f)-(h)(1). 
144 Addendum available upon request (on file with Mr. Ben Attia, Univ. of Del.). 
145 See Cal. Civ. Code § 714 (2015). 
146 Anders et al., supra note 57, at 363-65. 
147 Danica Kirka, Boom Forecast and Builders Ready, L.A. TIMES (Feburary 5, 1996), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-02-05/news/mn-32603_1_santa-clarita-city. 
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A few years after construction began and the Tesoro del Valle community 
started selling homes in the unfinished development community, the CC&Rs, 
including the portion of its charter that established the ACC, were filed with 
the recorder of deeds of Santa Clarita County.148 Recording the CC&Rs is an 
environmental transaction in this approach to the comparative institutional 
analysis method because it established Tesoro’s property right to regulate 
housing lot modifications and construction within the community — 
modifications that include solar arrays. This does not exhibit undue control 
over the Griffins in these cases because they must voluntarily subject 
themselves to the forfeiture of these rights and to the associated stream of 
benefits in order to purchase the home.  
Approximately six months later, in December 2003, the ACC ratified its 
“Design Guidelines” for the forthcoming Tesoro del Valle community.149 
This transaction is also considered to be a community dispute resolution 
process. Similar to the transaction establishing the CC&Rs, the issue 
regarding the design guidelines was as follows: Do the design guidelines 
imposed by the Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowner’s Association provide 
for the “reasonable” regulation of home improvement projects within the 
community? In this transaction, as in the previous transaction where the 
Griffins purchased their home in the Tesoro del Valle community, they 
accepted that they did not have full rights to make improvements to their 
property, but instead were subject to the approval of the ACC in accordance 
with the design guidelines.  
On November 8, 2007, the Griffins’ application to install the solar array 
was denied by the ACC because it was incomplete.150 Again, this transaction 
falls under the community dispute resolution process framework. When the 
Griffins agreed to the CC&Rs and design guidelines upon moving into the 
home, they also accepted Tesoro’s right to approve the solar array installation 
                                                
148 Tesoro at 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).  (“On May 29, 2003, the developer of the Tesoro 
community recorded with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office a Master 
Declaration of Establishment of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Tesoro del 
Valle (CC&R’s).”). 
149 Id. at 171 (“In December 2003, Tesoro approved Design Guidelines to ‘help assure 
continuity in design, which will help preserve and improve the appearance of the 
community.’”). 
150 Id. at 172 (“Also on November 8, 2007—before the expiration of the 45-day time 
limit—the ACC issued a letter denying appellants’ application.”). 
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through the ACC. The denial of Griffins’ application created a legal duty 
with respect to the solar panels.  
The same day the Griffins were denied application, they signed a contract 
with Advanced Solar Electric for the installation of a solar array totaling 
$97,000, and shortly thereafter oversaw the installation of the solar array on 
the slope outside the perimeter wall of their property.151 This action appeared 
to  violate the duty to seek community permission — an “illegal externality” 
or a failed type of market transaction in the Duke typology.152,153 In terms of 
property rights analysis, the Griffins assumed the right to the high-intensity 
use of the slope and its sunlight rather than respecting the rights of the 
community articulated through the CC&Rs. The Tesoro community had to 
bear the temporary negative aesthetic costs of the panels, as well as perhaps 
reduced property values, until the property rights conflict could be settled.  
The Tesoro ACC brought suit against the Griffins for breach of 
contract,154 and on July 13, 2009, the Los Angeles County Superior Court 
ruled in favor of Tesoro.155 The court held that the Griffins breached their 
contractual obligation to abide by the CC&Rs by installing a solar energy 
system on their property despite the denial of their application. In support of 
this claim, the Court of Appeals decision held that Tesoro complied with the 
CC&Rs, while the Griffins “were not entitled to any relief and were required 
to remove the 22 solar panels from their hillside slope.” 156  The California 
Court of Appeals found that the Griffins’ appeal on the reasonableness 
standards of the California Solar Rights Act was a question of fact for the 
                                                
151 Id. (“Instead, on November 8, 2007, they signed a $97,000 contract with Advanced 
Solar Electric for the installation of the new proposed solar energy system… 
Nonetheless, appellants proceeded with the installation of a solar energy system in 
January 2008.”).   
152 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 28, at 563-64, 579. 
153 See Duke, supra note 67. 
154 Tesoro at 173 (“Tesoro’s complaint alleged causes of action for breach of contract and 
negligence and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.”). 
155 See Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. Griffin, No. PC042530 (Cal. App. 
Dep’t Super. Ct. July 13, 2009). 
156 Tesoro, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 174-75. 
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jury, not one of law, and that they impermissibly attempted to reverse this 
distinction on appeal.157  
The decision also cites a precedent-setting case in this arena, whose 
outcome results in reasonableness standards being set as a question of fact.158 
As a result of this decision, the Tesoro neighbors secured a formal right to 
manage the resource at stake — the ability to install or prevent the 
installation of a solar array — in accordance with the CC&R contract that the 
Griffins signed, limiting the rights the Griffins’ had to install a solar energy 
system, and specifically a restriction not to install on the slope.  
The Griffins appealed the decision, but, on October 3, 2011, the 
California Court of Appeals also sided with Tesoro because the CC&Rs were 
ruled not to “unreasonably” regulate solar-array installations.159 In the final 
judicial transaction, the California Appellate Court held that the Griffins 
would be forced to remove the portion of the solar array on the slope outside 
their perimeter wall because it violated the CC&Rs.  
Thus, the transactions in this case study ultimately resulted in a nuanced 
property rights allocation; the solar rights owner was afforded some solar 
access rights, but not in ways that overly diminished the aesthetic 
expectations of neighbors as articulated through CC&Rs. With reference to 
Figure 1, the expensive enforcement action clarified that this solar rights 
regime existed between the two extremes of total developed use rights and 
total solar owner rights. The nuanced allocation offers some evidence that 
solar conflicts might arise because the solar owner thinks that solar rights 
statutes provide more complete property rights than they actually do. The 
nuanced allocation, in addition, suggests that expensive enforcement will 
result in a sharing of benefits and burdens. This further suggests that conflicts 
might be resolved in a win-win pattern — or one that attenuates any absolute 
rights to any one party. This case study, however, suggested that determining 
the shared benefit and burden outcome required costly litigation. The 
                                                
157 Id. at 176-77. 
158 Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n v. Rodman, 227 Cal. Rptr. 81, 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(regarding the Palos Verdes case: “According to the court: ‘The issue here is whether the 
Association’s Guidelines are a “reasonable restriction” on the installation of solar units, 
as required by section 714. This is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of 
fact.’”). 
159 Tesoro, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 174-75. 
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normative section below discusses whether this outcome might be available 
directly from the CID building upon their CC&Rs, or what we call the 
community dispute resolution process. The article next turns to a 
specification of the final rights allocation and then an analysis of the 
processes used to determine this allocation. 
VIII. PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS AND HOHFELDIAN CORRELATES 
The conflict in Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowner’s Association160 
centers on the relative power of neighbors to use homeowner’s associations 
to assert their property rights using CC&Rs. Specifically, when the CC&Rs 
seem to conflict with the statutory rights assigned to solar owners for the 
installation of solar PV panels under the California Solar Rights Act of 
1978.161 The informal Hohfeldian162 correlates in this case shed light on the 
positions of both parties in relation to the property right in question. 
Specifically, the Griffins were the high-intensity user and thus the privileged 
party in the presumptive rights regime. The party of no right was Tesoro, 
who must move to formal conflict resolution in order to contest the Griffins’ 
presumption of the right to install the panels. 
The California Court of Appeals, Second District, denied the Griffins’ 
appeal. Judge Rhodes wrote that the Griffins were “unmindful of applicable 
standards of review” in writing the appeal and affirmed the trial court and 
jury’s decision to grant declaratory and injunctive relief to Tesoro.163 The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the CC&Rs, and 
their application, were considered satisfactory for the definition of 
reasonableness under the California Solar Rights Act.164 This required the 
Griffins to pay to remove the contended panels (those on the slope adjacent 
                                                
160 Id. 
161 See Cal. Civ. Code § 714 (2015). 
162 Hohfeld, supra note 129. 
163 Tesoro at 170 (“Unmindful of applicable standards of review, appellants raise a host 
of issues in an effort to undermine the jury verdict. We affirm.”). 
164 Id. at 175 (“Appellants raise several issues relating to the interpretation and 
application of section 714, contending that any issue relating to that provision should not 
have gone to the jury, the CC&R’s as a matter of law failed to comply with that provision 
and Tesoro did not satisfy its burden under the statute. Keeping in mind that we review 
these questions from a jury verdict, we find no merit to appellants’ contentions.”). 
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to their home), and to restore the drainage of the slope to its original 
condition.165 With respect to the panels on the slope, the Griffins became the 
duty-bearer in the Hohfeldian166 formal rights regime that resulted from the 
enforced CC&Rs.  
The Tesoro neighbors won the case and, as a result, were awarded the 
property right for the development community to maintain their property 
values without bearing the cost of the aesthetic externality caused by the 
visible and reflective panels on the slope at the edge of their property. The 
homeowner’s association was responsible for maintaining the homogeneity 
of the community’s appearance and protecting the value of the equally zoned 
residential properties, and could do so through the result of the conflict 
resolution. As a result, the Tesoro neighbors became the right-holding party 
in the Hohfeldian167 formal rights regime. 
IX. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The case study data can be used to provide broader insight about what 
happens when two different institutions assign formal property rights in 
conflict — but also when one institution specifies a “reasonableness” 
standard to handle inconsistencies. Beginning in a rights regime characterized 
by solar statutes, there are two competing conflict resolution processes for 
enforcement: the judicial system alone and local CC&Rs followed by the 
courts. These processes carry differing procedures, goals, and participation 
costs. Courts assign rights at high cost, while community-level dispute 
resolution seeks to reach a final allocation of rights efficiently through 
negotiated settlements at very low transaction and enforcement costs. 
Because there is a differential between the costs of participating in each of 
these resolution processes, the point of comparison is costs of enforcement.  
The statutory assignment of rights to solar owners was previously argued 
to be a powerful force in determining rights and also a new and growing 
force in the United States. On the other hand, developed uses were also 
implied to be a waning force. This case study suggests that voluntary, 
                                                
165 Id. (“The jury determined that appellants were not entitled to any relief and were 
required to remove the 22 solar panels from their hillside slope.”). 
166 See Hohfeld, supra note 129. 
167 Id. 
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market-based restrictions on rights – in this case, CC&Rs – may be one 
vehicle for developed uses to restrict solar rights.  
A. Participation-Centered Approach 
In Komesar’s participation-centered approach, the “benefits and costs of 
participation”168 are analytical constructs. An example of the benefits of 
participation is the ability to defend one’s interests within a resolution 
process and secure a valuable right. The extent to which the process protects 
the procedural rights of both parties can be used as a benchmark by which to 
assess its fairness, here defined as the ability to participate.169 That is not to 
say that all processes strive for access to full participation for all parties. 
Market externalities are, by definition, inequitable to the victims of pollution. 
Or, as many in the law and economics school of thought argue, courts largely 
deliver efficient outcomes.170 The costs of participation can occur as 
transaction costs (in markets), lobbying costs (in legislatures), or litigation 
costs (in courts).171 These costs might also include the costs of organizing a 
party, of negotiation between parties, or of enforcement or maintenance of a 
resulting institutional decision.172 In many environmental conflicts, these 
costs often impede the low-intensity user of a resource at stake from 
participating fully and challenging the privileged user.173 Although the costs 
of assigning solar rights via statutes are low, there is an asymmetry in the 
costs of enforcing those rights between the two studied resolution processes. 
The case study suggests that the community dispute resolution processes 
offered less expensive participation for both parties.  
When the Griffins bought their home in the Tesoro del Valle community 
in 2005, they purchased the property subject to limitations in the scope of 
uses in the CC&Rs. The legal question was whether the Griffins violated 
these terms when they installed the solar array without prior permission from 
the ACC. It is clear that their ability to participate in this process — which 
                                                
168 See KOMESAR, supra  note 12. 
169 See Duke, supra note 66. 
170 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business: Aspen Publishers, 7th ed. 2007). 
171 See Duke, supra note 67. 
172 See Komesar, supra note 9.  
173 Id. 
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combines elements of voluntary markets (land purchase) and a decentralized, 
market-based dispute resolution (CC&Rs) — is relatively high. In the 
language of the participation-centered approach,174 the Griffins had a 
concentrated interest, high stakes per capita, low organization costs, and high 
cohesiveness.175 The Griffins likely had a commensurate level of financial 
resources as their neighbors, though the homeowner’s association collects 
many neighbors’ interests into a single decision making unit, which likely 
provides an advantage in association votes and in overcoming the costs of 
litigation. Indeed, the Griffins’ association dues were likely used, in part, to 
pursue the legal case against them. However, the current estimated value of 
the Griffins’ property at time of this writing, about $1.2 million,176 as well as 
the $96,000 cost of the solar installation,177 suggested that the Griffins were 
less likely than the average household to be constrained by participation 
costs.  
The Tesoro community is the low-intensity user, whose interests focus on 
reducing and eliminating external costs from other neighbors and mutually 
maintaining, or increasing, their property values by not allowing the Griffins 
to further develop this portion of their land with solar panels. The Tesoro 
homeowner’s association is a highly concentrated interest. Like the Griffins’ 
house, the neighborhood consists of relatively expensive housing. Tesoro’s 
homeowner’s association is also organized in that it is represented by the 
ACC and thus has a specialized mechanism to process applications for 
property modifications in the community — which effectively makes it, a 
catalytic subgroup.178 Both the Griffins and Tesoro likely possess sufficient 
abilities to participate in the resolution processes.  
The ability to participate in procedural conflict resolution involves the 
opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision maker and to face a similar 
                                                
174 See Komesar, supra note 9. 
175 Tesoro at 170 (“Defendants and appellants Martin and Carolyn Griffin appeal …”). 
176 29313 Hacienda Ranch Ct, ZILLOW, INC. (September 21, 2014), 
http://www.zillow.com/homedetails/29313-Hacienda-Ranch-Ct-Santa-Clarita-CA-
91354/65246960_zpid/. 
177 Tesoro, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (“Instead, on November 8, 2007, they signed a $97,000 
contract with Advanced Solar Electric for the installation of the new proposed solar 
energy system.”). 
178 Neil A. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a 
Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657, 674-75 (1988). 
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distribution of the benefits and burdens within a conflict resolution 
process.179 The variance of the distribution of benefits and burdens 
throughout the conflict resolution process and their final distribution between 
the parties once the buyer and the seller have been established reveals the 
balance of procedural ability to participate and the substantive result of 
participation: effectively, a comparison of the ends and the means. In Tesoro 
del Valle Master Homebuilders Association, the legislative resolution process 
had a superior ability to protect the social goal of procedural fairness than the 
homeowner’s association’s ACC community dispute resolution process.  
However, when enforcement of these equitable results is considered, the 
result is not so clear. 
The legislative resolution process in this conflict is the 1978 California 
Solar Rights Act. The Act created a framework that allowed homeowners to 
enter an adjudicative process to usurp the CC&Rs of their homeowner’s 
associations and install solar installations on their homes in homeowner’s 
association-regulated communities. It is also designed to protect the interests 
of homeowners and their rights to install solar energy systems.180 The Act 
also coordinates expectations among all solar owners (existing and potential) 
and all neighbors - an important purpose given the common law tradition 
favoring developed uses. The Act “balances the needs of individual solar 
energy system owners with other property owners by developing solar access 
rights.”181 However, the Solar Rights Act does allow CC&Rs to include 
provisions that impose “reasonable” restrictions on installations, which are 
defined in California Civil Code § 714 as those that do not increase the cost 
or decrease the energy efficiency of the system by more than twenty 
percent.182 This balancing, however, is skewed eighty percent in favor of the 
solar owner and twenty percent in favor of the neighbors, based on the Act’s 
                                                
179 See Duke, supra note 67. 
180 PRAW & LAUFER, supra note 97. (“The California legislature enacted the Act in 1978 
to protect a homeowner’s right to install a solar energy system by limiting an HOA’s 
ability to object to such installations through its CC&Rs.”). 
181 Solar Rights: Access to the Sun for Solar Systems, GO SOLAR CALIFORNIA, (last 
visited September 28, 2014), http://www.gosolarcalifornia.ca.gov/solar_basics/rights.php. 
182 PRAW & LAUFER, supra note 97. (“‘Significant’ is further defined as those restrictions 
that increase the system’s cost by over 20 percent or decrease the system’s efficiency by 
over 20 percent.”). 
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standard of reasonableness.183  
The Design Guidelines adopted by the Tesoro del Valle homeowners’ 
association reserved its right under the California Solar Rights Act to impose 
“reasonable” restrictions on solar installations, pending review from the 
homeowner’s association’s ACC.184 Although the provisions of the Act185 fall 
heavily in favor of the homeowner — especially with respect to common law 
precedent — a neighbor’s ability to participate is not necessarily limited by 
the initial assignment of rights. The owners of developed uses also had the 
ability to (1) pursue their uses prior to the Act, and (2) have their voices 
heard at the legislature. The twenty percent concession suggests that these 
voices were heard at the legislature. Furthermore, the weak enforcement 
mechanisms accompanying the rights allocation suggests that solar owners 
had less influence in the legislative resolution process than initially assumed. 
Compared to the relative performance of the Tesoro ACC community 
dispute resolution process, the California Solar Rights Act at first appears 
better positioned to defend parties’ ability to participate because it is 
universally applied across the state of California. Owners, regardless of 
resources, had their perspectives recognized by the legislative process, while 
the community dispute resolution process places additional hurdles on 
participation. However, when poorly centralized enforcement of legislated 
rights is considered, the two processes seem rather similar in terms of the 
disputants’ abilities to participate. While the establishment of the CC&Rs by 
the homeowner’s association and the Design Guidelines by the ACC are only 
contractually binding to those who agree with full knowledge to accept and 
abide by them and voluntarily live in the Tesoro community, these CC&Rs 
and Design Guidelines do not maintain an equal standard of participation 
                                                
183 Id. (“Section 714 of the Act permits CC&Rs to include provisions that impose 
reasonable restrictions on installations. ‘Reasonable’ restrictions included those that: 1) 
do not significantly increase the cost of the solar system, 2) do not significantly decrease 
the system’s efficiency or specified performance, or 3) allow for an alternative system of 
comparable cost, efficiency and benefits.”). 
184 PRAW & LAUFER, supra note 117. Section 714 of the Act permits CC&Rs to include 
provisions that impose reasonable restrictions on installations. “Reasonable” restrictions 
included those that: 1) do not significantly increase the cost of the solar system, 2) do not 
significantly decrease the system’s efficiency or specified performance, or 3) allow for an 
alternative system of comparable cost, efficiency and benefits.  
185Cal. Civ. Code § 714 (2015). 
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ability. This is because they are highly subjective to the interpretation of the 
decision makers on the ACC, which is comprised of other members of the 
Tesoro community who have a vested interest in not being harmed by the 
externality of the Griffins’ solar panels. The members of the ACC are by no 
means an impartial body, and therefore may discolor the ease of entry present 
in their quasi-alternative dispute resolution or quasi-market resolution 
process. The California Solar Rights Act also exhibits limitations in 
procedural fairness arising at the enforcement stage.186 Although the 
community dispute resolution process also has procedural limitations that 
vary with income, it is difficult to say that one is clearly superior when 
enforcement is considered.  
B. Substantive Efficiency Analysis 
This section follows the economic-efficiency analytical approach in 
Duke, which is built on the Coasean analysis of efficiency.187 The analysis 
begins by establishing which of the conflicting parties is the highest-valued 
user of the resource at stake. This determination must be made on a case-by-
case basis. As stated, according to the Coase Theorem, if there are positive 
transaction costs and the conditional right is not assigned to the highest-
valued user, the outcome will be inefficient.188, Here, as in Komesar’s 
Imperfect alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public 
Policy, substantive efficiency “reflects an allocation of resources that 
maximizes the value of social product.”189  Coasean efficiency simply means 
that the final right holder pursues a use of the resource at stake that results in 
the greatest gains for society.190 In the case of solar conflicts, if there are 
large relative transaction costs, then the social product will be larger if the 
rights are assigned to the party with the highest valued use.  
This conflict presents an atypical assignment of the high-intensity user 
and the low-intensity user.191 In most conflicts in environmental law, the 
                                                
186 Id.  
187 See Coase, supra note 2; See Duke, supra note 67. 
188 See Coase, supra note 2; See Duke, supra note 67. 
189 Duke & Csoboth, supra note 28, at 584. 
190 See Duke, supra note 5, Coase, supra note 2. 
191 See Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. Griffin, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
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high-intensity user is more sophisticated, wealthy, and organized, with a high 
concentration of interest and acting upon privilege, while the low-intensity 
user is often disorganized. However, in Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners 
Association, the high intensity users are the Griffins, seeking to develop the 
slope on their property with a solar installation, and therefore the highest 
valued user.192 Consequently, the low intensity user is Tesoro, who represents 
the neighbors who are interested in the slope returning back to its previous, 
undeveloped state or at least securing a compensatory payment.  
In the legislative-legal resolution process, transaction costs are quite high, 
whereas the community dispute resolution process has little to no transaction 
costs. This is a key insight of this case for a broader analysis — and one that 
likely applies in other solar disputes taking place in common interest 
developments (“CIDs”). Therefore, according to Coase, it is important that 
the legislative-legal process assign the initial allocation of rights to the 
highest valued user, if substantive efficiency is to be achieved.193 However, 
in the community dispute resolution process, the initial allocation of rights 
ought to have no effect on the final allocation of rights, or on social 
efficiency.  Thus the community dispute resolution will be more likely to 
deliver efficient results — regardless of who holds the highest valued use. 
The efficiency of the legislative-legal in the case study necessarily 
depends on whether a process tends to assign rights to the highest-valued 
user. The value of the Griffins’ use of the solar PV installation is at least 
$96,000, the cost of the system.194 Additionally, they will accumulate cost 
savings on their electricity bill each month, potentially gain benefits from net 
metering, and enjoy non-pecuniary existence benefits because they have a 
reduced carbon footprint. These direct and existence benefits extend to others 
who gain a small amount of utility from simply knowing there is a solar 
installation on the Griffins’ house in Santa Clarita in the form of existence 
values, which are higher than one may suspect because there is a very large 
population who gain even a small benefit from this knowledge.  
The value of Tesoro’s use of the land and its sunlight is likely lower, 
                                                
192 See Coase, supra note 2. 
193 Id.  
194 See Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. Griffin, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
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represented by the lack of lost property value for the neighbors due to the 
panels’ unsightliness and glare. Additionally, Tesoro’s use of the land results 
in smaller nonuse benefits because that small plot of land is not being 
developed and is remaining in a, arguably, natural state. Based on these 
results, the balance of evidence suggests that the Griffins are the highest 
valued users of the resource at stake. In other solar disputes in CIDs, 
however, one would suspect that the balance of valued interests might tip 
against the solar owner. 
The substantive efficiency of the California Solar Rights Act is low 
because, although it assigns more complete rights to the highest valued user, 
it does not enforce them well.195 The lack of enforcement is a transaction 
cost.196 Although the Griffins were the highest valued user in their conflict, 
this is not always the case. Because the legislative enforcement resolution 
process has high transaction costs, overall social efficiency of the current 
legislative-legal process in this case study is suboptimal. The ability of the 
Act to result in maximum resource allocation efficiency is lost because of 
these high transaction costs in information, contracting, and especially 
enforcement.197 Because the Act carries the rule of law, it is difficult and 
expensive to enforce evenly and justly, especially across a large state such as 
California.198 
The community dispute resolution process represented by the ACC is 
superior, because, barring complete and total non-compliance, the process 
essentially becomes a simple bargaining market transaction, when transaction 
costs are very low. This is a suggestive result for Coasean bargaining, but it 
also applies to less-formally resolved conflicts. As Ellickson argues, legally 
binding dispute resolution processes can often be avoided in favor of 
negotiating with informal norms while still reaching socially efficient 
outcomes.199 His empirical research showed a remarkable trend: the law is 
often far less important in dispute resolution than previously assumed.200 
Similar to Ellickson’s research, conducted in nearby Shasta County, 
                                                
195 Cal. Civ. Code § 714 (2015). 
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California, the ACC creates a largely informal bargaining process that must 
operate inside the law, thus greatly increasing transaction costs, when there is 
a need to enforce a non-compliant breach of contract. However, this norms-
based argument has the potential to leave final rights assignments to the law, 
and go directly to a market process to re-allocate property rights in a conflict 
with low transaction costs. Here, the ACC could bargain or negotiate with the 
Griffins over the conditions under which they could build the panels. For 
example, with an agreement to compensate their neighbors for the aesthetic 
externality they would create. The community dispute resolution process is 
therefore considered to maintain a greater degree of substantive efficiency 
than the legislative process. 
C. Descriptive Policy Analysis 
The central claim of this analysis of the case study is that there exist 
unrecognized enforcement costs of statutorily assigned solar rights that 
undercut the performance of the legislative resolution process. This is a topic 
that appears to be underappreciated in the legal literature on solar rights. 
Because statutes have the potential to assign initial rights to the lowest valued 
user and because there are significant transaction costs in resolution through 
courts, the Coasean conclusion follows that the final allocation of rights will 
not necessarily be efficient.201 Indeed, it is very challenging for solar owners 
to enforce their rights. 
In contrast, the case study also shows that community dispute resolution 
processes reflected in the CC&Rs — although working against the solar 
interests in this case — have a surprisingly great potential to resolve solar 
conflicts with low transaction costs. Moreover, the CC&R process shows that 
a nuanced property rights outcome was produced, one in which the solar 
owner and the neighbors both were awarded property rights. This result 
suggests the potential benefits of a more fully developed community dispute 
resolution process.  
Of particular interest in the comparative institutional analysis of Tesoro 
del Valle Master Homeowner’s Association, one sees that the transaction 
costs are lower at the neighborhood conflict-resolution level. The analysis 
suggests that this results in a related advantage with respect to procedural 
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fairness. In sum, the asymmetry between the enforcement costs of statutes in 
courts and the transaction costs of private negotiation suggests that 
community dispute resolution may be a better way to resolve residential solar 
conflicts in terms of both participation and efficiency.  
X. NORMATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS 
This section outlines ways in which the community dispute resolution 
process might be formally incorporated into the enforcement provisions of 
solar statutes so as to take advantage of the comparative institutional analysis 
results. We envision a process akin to alternative dispute resolution with 
enabling legislation supporting outcomes that are enforceable contracts. In 
other words, this is a quasi-alternative dispute resolution process that relies 
on local nongovernmental bodies to resolve disputes pursuant to private 
contracts and local, state, and federal laws outside formal legal resolution.  
A key aspect of this new conflict resolution process is the necessity of 
local community stakeholders to be represented in the process, regardless of 
level of the stakes-per-capita. Barring total non-compliance, which requires 
formal litigation, this legislative-community dispute resolution process 
enables the parties to reach a highly efficient outcome with low transaction 
costs if both parties submit to the authority of the private body and the statute 
or binding contract backing the body’s authority. In Tesoro del Valle Master 
Homeowner’s Association, the private body responsible for administering 
this decision is the homeowners association and its ACC. Similar options 
include local government (city council, town board, community associations, 
etc.), a municipal mediation service, or even creation of a local-level 
certification for arbiters specializing in solar rights disputes.  
Additionally, it is possible to align with Ellickson’s and Klein & Leffler’s 
view and provide no framework, allowing the initial assignment of rights to 
be left to social norms, and for negotiation to occur privately.202 The 
community dispute resolution process has the potential to be a highly 
effective method of dispute resolution at the community level, which results 
in substantively efficient outcomes. Some of the technical levers involved in 
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private negotiation include location, azimuth, square footage, percentage of 
allowable shading, and even the albedo of the panels. States could develop 
standardized “negotiation sheets” for less-experienced community dispute 
resolution disputants to negotiate over.  
From an economic perspective, this market-based solution likely involves 
negotiating side payments to homes in the viewshed of the array, possibly in 
the form of a proportion of energy savings, a portion of Solar Renewable 
Energy Credits (“SREC”) sales, or perhaps a subsidy from the Federal 
Investment Tax Credit benefits.203  However, the informal creation of what is 
effectively a private easement market depends on neighbors who are willing 
to negotiate and reach a socially efficient outcome. Colleen Kettles has 
delineated a list of well-defined factors that could be involved with a solar 
easement.204  
XI. CONCLUSION 
The comparative institutional analysis method seeks to determine the 
most efficient resolution process to solve a specific type of environmental 
conflict.205 By tracking the transactions data for a resource at stake from non-
activation to final market outcome, it is possible to make defensible 
determinations regarding the “best of the bads” of available and appropriate 
resolution processes.206 Comparing the legislative-litigation process under the 
California Solar Rights Act to the CC&R enforcement and the related, newly 
titled community dispute resolution process in terms of these metrics, allows 
conclusions to be drawn about how to use these resolution processes to better 
meet societal goals.  
Both the California Solar Rights Act and the homeowner’s association 
ACC have merits in terms of procedural fairness and substantive efficiency. 
However, in this conflict — which was the California Solar Rights Act’s first 
test — the legislative resolution process was less successful in enforcing the 
                                                
203 These credits allow electricity suppliers to meet their renewable portfolio standards. 
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rights of the solar owner as it is intended to do. The community dispute 
resolution process was superior to the legislative because it allows disputants 
to participate and lowers transaction costs. This is more likely to lead to 
efficient outcomes, regardless of who holds the highest valued use. 
The case study suggests a unique new category of resolution process that 
has the potential to greatly increased substantive efficiency in community-
level conflicts. The community dispute resolution process is effective in 
creating what is essentially a market or informal negotiation that occurs with 
low transaction costs. These private and pseudo-private negotiations 
represent a potential means to an efficient end in conflicts that involve a 
community structure in which most or all of the associated parties in the 
community have at least a low-valued use of the resource at stake. 
Particularly in conflicts that involve majorities with low per-capita stakes or 
even dormant majorities, the parties’ ability to participate207 will not be 
hindered as much as in an alternate resolution process. Additionally, this 
research dovetails with Ellickson’s208 conclusions about informal norms, 
excepting the fact that the community dispute resolution process might also 
include a binding legal contract.  
This finding has wide implications for environmental policy because it 
represents the power of markets and informal negotiation to solve 
environmental conflicts. If markets value the environment without creating 
externalities, resource extraction rates and use rates will be sustainable and 
efficient. There is difficulty in accurate measurement of the economic values 
of ecosystem services, non-use values, and other related theorized values on 
the environment, but using the judgment of people who have a direct stake in 
the conflict as members of the community, despite their slight personal bias, 
will allow fair determinations of highest-valued uses. Highest-valued use 
determinations are likely to arise from the community dispute resolution 
process. Support for similar community boards in situations where all 
members of the community have a stake in the conflict (such as in a 
development community in which each owns property) is a powerful tool. 
Community governance of environmental conflicts allows those directly 
affected to have a low cost “say” in the decision-making process, a valuable 
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tool for low per-capita stake conflicts and an especially powerful force in 
forwarding environmental justice in low-income communities.  
To make this resolution process even fairer, California could mobilize a 
small force of state planners to help facilitate these types of community 
disputes. If an impartial third party can establish the percentage loss of 
efficiency and percentage increase in cost, the community board can use 
these data to make decisions within the context of the private contracts and 
the California Solar Rights Act. This new method of resolving environmental 
conflicts can be a highly powerful tool for assigning rights and creating 
market outcomes without the need for adjudication.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
